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Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and
Barriers to Entry
Joanna M. Shepherd†
Abstract
Biologic drugs represent an important new category of drugs in
the effort to improve health outcomes in this country. Yet, these
cutting-edge drugs are often cost prohibitive, preventing access for
many Americans. Recognizing the need for more affordable, generic
substitutes for biologic drugs—or biosimilars—Congress recently
created a biosimilars approval pathway that would enable these
cheaper biologic drugs to obtain FDA approval and reach patients
more quickly. Unfortunately, original biologics manufacturers have
sought to extend their current monopoly profits by erecting various
legal and regulatory barriers to entry. Their legal maneuvers take
many forms, from delaying approval of safe biosimilars to abrogating
previous commitments to international drug-naming protocols, and
even circumventing Congressional intent for biosimilar substitution.
Regrettably, these policies reduce competition in the market for
biologic drugs, impede drug innovation, increase drug costs, and limit
patient access to these important medications. This article explores
the conflict between biologics and biosimilars, and the consequences
that barriers to biosimilar entry in this market will create.
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Introduction
Medications comprise a significant share of both America’s
economy in general, and its health care sector in specific. With annual
spending over $320 billion,1 prescription drugs consume over 10
percent of all American medical spending.2 Spending on a relatively
new category of medications, biological drugs—or biologics—is
growing rapidly. In 2013, biologics comprised a quarter of drug
spending,3 rising to potentially two-thirds of drug spending by 2015.4
These cutting-edge drugs offer patients with complicated and
otherwise fatal diseases hope for remission or even an outright cure.
Yet they are often prohibitively expensive, with courses of treatment
for diseases from rheumatoid arthritis to breast cancer to multiple
sclerosis running tens to even hundreds of thousands of dollars per
patient.5 As a result, many patients do not have access to these lifesaving treatments.
Fortunately, Congress has recognized the need for cheaper,
generic substitutes for biologic drugs—or biosimilars. As part of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), Congress created a biosimilars approval
pathway that would enable these cheaper biologic drugs to obtain
FDA approval and reach patients more quickly. Consumers stand to
benefit significantly from the new market competition between lower-

1.

FTC, Public Workshop: Follow-On Biologics: Impact of Recent
Legislative and Regulatory Naming Proposals on Competition, 78 Fed.
Reg. 68840, 68841 (Nov. 15, 2013).

2.

See, e.g., Nation’s Health Dollar ($2.7 Trillion), Calendar Year 2011:
Where it Went, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/StatisticsTrends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/PieChartSourcesExpen
ditures2011.pdf.

3.

Andrew Pollack, Biotech Firms, Billions at Risk, Lobby States to Limit
Generics,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
29,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/battle-in-states-ongeneric-copies-of-biotech-drugs.html?_r=0.

4.

Steve Miller, The $250 Billion Potential of Biosimilars, EXPRESS
SCRIPTS LAB (Apr. 23, 2013), http://lab.express-scripts.com/specialitymedications/the-250-billion-potential-ofbiosimilars/#sthash.EVnF5tSn.dpuf.

5.

See JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34045, FDA
REGULATION OF FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 2 (2010) [hereinafter CRS FDA
REPORT].
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cost, but similarly effective, biosimilars; in fact, estimates suggest this
competition could save consumers $250 billion over the next decade.6
Unfortunately, as with traditional brand-name pharmaceuticals
and generics, original biologics manufacturers have sought to extend
their monopoly profits by erecting legal and regulatory barriers to
entry and use. These companies broadly resist the availability of
biosimilars and have successfully lobbied both the FDA and state
legislatures to obstruct the biosimilars approval pathway.7 The legal
maneuvers employed by pharmaceutical and biologics manufacturers
take many forms, from delaying approval of safe biosimilars to
abrogating previous commitments to international drug-naming
protocols to circumventing Congressional intent for biosimilar
substitution. These policies reduce competition in the market for
biologic drugs, impede drug innovation, increase drug costs, and limit
patient access to these important medications, thus frustrating the
ACA’s goals of increasing healthcare availability while controlling
healthcare costs.
This analysis examines in detail the conflict between biologic drug
exclusivity and patient access to biologically similar drugs, or
biosimilars. Like traditional prescription drugs, potential biologics
require large up-front research and development costs; these costs
attend equally large product failure rates. Federal law accordingly
provides biologic manufacturers with a lengthy exclusivity period to
recoup these costs. But while a statutory exclusivity period prompts
original manufacturers to further innovation, it comes at the expense
of increased prices and reduced access to potent biologics.
Legislators and regulators must strike a careful balance between
permitting certain companies to earn monopoly profits and allowing
free competition and broad drug availability to patients. Lessons from
economic principles, sound empirical analysis, and other countries’
experiences suggest that impeding biosimilars’ entry to market will
harm consumers and patients with little to no corresponding benefits
except to pharmaceutical monopolists.
This analysis begins by exploring the background, history, and
substantial benefits behind biologics and close substitutes to biologics,
with reference to the historically familiar conflict between traditional
name-brand and generic prescription drugs. The analysis then turns
to several proposed regulatory and legislative roadblocks on an
already-enacted federal pathway for expedited approval of safe,
6.

Steve Miller, Senior Vice President & Chief Medical Officer of Express
Scripts, Customer Perspective on Biosimilars, 7, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/FollowOn%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legis
lative%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Compet
ition/miller.pdf.

7.

See Pollack, supra note 3.
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biologically similar substitutes for known biologics. These roadblocks
include recent actions by the FDA and bills enacted and proposed
before multiple state legislatures. It discusses why these proposals,
instead of promoting consumer safety as some advocates insist, will
raise prices and decrease patient access to potent biologics, ultimately
denying consumers top-quality medical care at more affordable prices.
These barriers to entry not only contravene the spirit of the ACA,
which provided speedier certification for substitute biologics, but also
increase costs and reduce competition, all for no established benefits
to patient safety or manufacturer innovation. I conclude that further
attempts to increase or protect exclusivity for biologics will help only
a few drug companies at the cost of healthcare markets, patient care,
and the American economy at large.

I.

Complex Medicine: A History of Biologics and
Consumer Benefits

Biologics both gather their name and primarily distinguish
themselves from traditional drugs by their origins. They are derived
from living organisms, typically proteins, though occasionally
including toxins, blood, viruses, or allergens.8 These medications
include many novel and powerful tools, and are far more complex
than traditional medicines. Where a traditional drug might contain
between a few dozen to a hundred atoms per molecule, the
complicated proteins of a biologic can include from several thousand
to tens of thousands of atoms per molecule.9 Biologics are
comparatively new relative to traditional drugs: The FDA only
cleared the first biologic for human use, human insulin, in 1982.10
Drug manufacturers and regulators alike recognize that the
inherent complexity of biologics introduces concerns not present with
their traditional counterparts—biologics cannot be perfectly
duplicated. Manufacturers can perfectly duplicate traditional drugs,
potentially guaranteeing the “absence of a significant difference”
between an FDA-approved drug and a proposed equivalent.11 This
effective duplication, or bioequivalence, defines the conventional
8.

Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and Incentivizing
Biosimilars, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 59 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(I)
(2006)).

9.

See, e.g., Joan Kerber-Walker, Small Molecules, Large Biologics, and
the Biosimilar Debate, ARIZ. BIOINDUSTRY ASS’N (Feb. 18, 2013),
http://www.azbio.org/small-molecules-large-biologics-and-the-biosimilardebate.

10.

CRS FDA REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.

11.

21 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2010). See also Henry Grabowski et al.,
Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic & Policy Issues,
41 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 512 n.5 (2011).
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relationship between a “brand-name” drug and a “generic” drug;
generic drugs, simply put, are bioequivalent substitutes for brandname counterparts. However, whereas bioequivalence is possible for a
chemically-synthesized drug with dozens or hundreds of atoms, it is
impossible to duplicate exactly complex biologics with tens of
thousands of atoms per molecule; even a chemically identical biologic
may produce different effects in the body because of the unique
structural organization pattern of the proteins (known as “folding”).12
In fact, biologics even vary slightly across batches from a single,
original manufacturer.13 As a result, companies looking to replicate a
biologic must instead use highly similar, but slightly variant, living
organisms or processes in creating a biosimilar (sometimes called a
“follow-on biologic,” or FOB), a substitute biologic copied from an
original biologic and designed to act as a “generic biologic.”14
The benefits of cheaper, more widely available generic drugs were
recognized in the market for traditional drugs three decades ago. As
FDA drug approvals proved notoriously slow and expensive, Congress
recognized the duplicative costs inherent in requiring bioequivalent
drugs to undergo the full procedural rigors behind FDA approval.
This prompted the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984.15 Hatch-Waxman
crafted a framework designed to both preserve incentives for “brandname” innovations as well as to encourage companies to create
bioequivalent drugs—generics—that copy these branded drugs. HatchWaxman granted brand-name manufacturers a period of patent
restoration, which extended a covered drug’s patent length by up to
five years (to a maximum of fourteen years) for half of the branded
drug’s clinical testing period and all time spent securing FDA
approval.16 It further conferred on branded drugs five years of brand
exclusivity—that is, a prohibition against FDA approval of
bioequivalent generic drugs for a limited window to ensure branded
manufacturers an adequate opportunity to recoup research costs and
12.

See, e.g., Kerber-Walker, supra note 9.

13.

Mark McCamish, Effect of Naming on Competition and Innovation,
SANDOZ BIOPHARMACEUTICALS, 6 (Dec. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/FollowOn%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legis
lative%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Compet
ition/mccamish.pdf.

14.

The term “generic biologic” is necessarily slightly imprecise; as
mentioned above, a “generic,” properly understood, is chemically
identical to its brand-name counterpart; biosimilars are simply highly
functionally similar, with no clinically meaningful differences in potency
or safety.

15.

Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).

16.

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2012).
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earn risk-adjusted profits.17 But in exchange for these new protections
to brand-name manufacturers, Hatch-Waxman actively created
incentives for generics to challenge brand-name patents, conferring a
limited exclusivity period to the first generic challenger to a brandname drug.18 Critically for potential generic drugs, Hatch-Waxman
created the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), a greatly
truncated FDA approval process allowing a generic that demonstrates
bioequivalence to rely on previously submitted brand-name safety and
efficacy data.19
Hatch-Waxman has successfully increased generic drug
development without reducing branded drug innovation. By reducing
both the time and cost for generic manufacturers seeking FDA
approval, Hatch-Waxman produced a rush of generics to the market.20
Whereas generics comprised only 19 percent of all prescriptions filled
prior to 1984, generics now represent over 84 percent of prescriptions
filled.21 This surge of cheaper generic products has produced
significant savings for consumers; in the last decade alone, generic
drugs have saved the health care system over $1 trillion dollars.22
Hatch-Waxman did not, however, quash research and development in
new drugs; in fact, drug development budgets have increased between
threefold and sixfold since Hatch-Waxman was enacted.23
17.

Id.

18.

In order for a generic drug to receive FDA approval before patent
expiration of the branded drug, the generic company must challenge the
branded drug’s patent as invalid, rather than arguing that it was
infringed by the generic drug or that it is unenforceable. Hatch-Waxman
encourages generic companies to challenge patents by granting a 180day period of market exclusivity to the first generic company that
challenges a patent and is either not sued by the branded manufacturer
or prevails in the subsequent lawsuit. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., Guidance for Industry: 180-Day Generic Drug
Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food,
Drug,
and
Cosmetic
Act
(June
1998),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm079342.pdf.

19.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).

20.

Grabowski et al., supra note 11, at 512-13.

21.

Letter from John E. Dicken, Dir., Health Care, U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Committee on Finance
(Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588064.pdf; IMS
INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, DECLINING MEDICINE USE AND
COSTS: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? A REVIEW OF THE USE OF MEDICINES IN
THE UNITED STATES IN 2012, at 15 (2013).

22.

Letter from John E. Dicken to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 21, at 4.

23.

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY,
7
(2006),
available
at
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/
10-02-drugr-d.pdf.
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Yet, because of the subtle distinction between bioequivalence and
biosimilarity, Hatch-Waxman increased generic competition in the
market for traditional drugs while failing to similarly encourage
follow-on biologics development and distribution. Hatch-Waxman’s
ANDA procedures applied only to bioequivalent drugs. Biosimilar
drugs and follow-on biologics as a class required full, individual FDA
testing and approval.24 This asymmetry rendered biologics broadly
immune to the downward pricing pressures that affected traditional
drugs in the decades following Hatch-Waxman.
Though this asymmetry between traditional drugs and biologics
persisted for several decades, Europe eventually led the way in
developing science-driven regulatory regimes in approving biosimilars
for consumer use.25 The European Commission established a
biosimilars approval pathway in 2004.26 The Commission formally
approved its first biosimilar drug—Omnitrope, a human growth
hormone—in April 2006, following a positive scientific opinion from
the European Medicines Agency (EMA).27 The EMA has subsequently
extensively investigated numerous proposed biosimilar drugs. The
European Union has approved nineteen biosimilar medicines for use in
Europe thus far.28 The EMA has concluded that all of these medicines
are “highly similar” to their biologic reference products, thus
presenting no relevant differences for therapeutic use.29
Europe’s faster biosimilar approval pathways have yielded
substantial benefits to patients, including lower drug costs and wider
biologic availability. One German study suggested European medical
savings of over €33.4 billion ($45.5 billion) by 2020, with over €20.4

24.

See Kanter & Feldman, supra note 8, at 62-63.

25.

See, e.g, Andrzej Wiecek & Ashraf Mikhail, European Regulatory
Guidelines for Biosimilars, 21 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION
v17,
v17-18
(2006),
available
at
http://ndt.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/suppl_5/v17.full.pdf.

26.

Biosimilars
in
the
EU,
GENERIC
PHARM.
ASS’N,
http://www.gphaonline.org/gpha-media/gpha-resources/biosimilars-inthe-eu (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).

27.

CRS FDA REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.

28.

European Public Assessment Reports, EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY,
available at http://www.ema.europa.eu (click the “Find Medicine” tab;
then click the “Human Medicines” tab; then click the “Browse by Type”
tab; then select the “Biosimilars” button; then click the “Submit”
button) (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).

29.

Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal Products, EUR. MED.
AGENCY,
at
6
(May
22,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_
guideline/2013/05/WC500142978.pdf.
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billion in savings from biosimilar antibody drugs alone.30 Another
estimate calculates that the European approval process for biosimilars
saves patients as much as 60 percent after four years of market
penetration. Even conservative figures estimate cost savings of 20 to
30 percent.31 A single drug recently approved for biosimilar use in
Europe recorded sales of over $2 billion in 2012 alone.32 Other
countries are following the European experience with biosimilars; for
example, Canada has also approved the use of biosimilar drugs under
some circumstances.33
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA),
part of the ACA, attempted to update the American approval
process.34 BPCIA provides an expedited biosimilars approval pathway
that largely tracks Hatch-Waxman’s framework for traditional drugs,
albeit with a few biologic-specific distinctions and some variance in
exclusivity periods. Most significantly, a proposed biologic substitute
does not have to demonstrate bioequivalence, but merely
biosimilarity, to a reference product. In other words, the proposed
biosimilar must show “no . . . meaningful differences . . . in terms of
safety, purity, and potency.”35 This distinction rectifies HatchWaxman’s failure with biosimilars by loosening the contextually
impossible bioequivalence standard.
Second, the BPCIA varies the exclusivity periods for biologics and
biosimilars. Under the BPCIA, a product approved as biosimilar may
further be deemed “interchangeable” with another biologic if its
manufacturer can demonstrate that switching between the reference
biologic and the proposed substitute presents no additional risk in
safety or efficacy for consumers.36 Importantly, under Federal law,
interchangeable products may be substituted for reference biologics

30.

Ben Hirschler, Analysis: Copycat Biotech Drugs Slow to Take off in
Europe,
REUTERS,
Dec.
3,
2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/us-biotech-copycatsanalysis-idUSBRE9B205I20131203.

31.

These figures vary substantially, but they are all significant. See
generally Grabowski et al., supra note 11, at 543 (listing multiple
estimates of biosimilars price discount evidence assuming robust
pathway for biosimilars approval).

32.

Hirschler, supra note 30.

33.

Cole Werble, Canadian Biosimilar Approvals for Remicade: Time to
Restart the Bus?, PHARMA & MED TECH BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE (Jan.
27, 2014), http://www.elsevierbi.com/publications/rpm-report/firsttake/2014/1/canadian-biosimilar-approvals-for-remicade.

34.

See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(B).

35.

Id. (emphasis added).

36.

Id. § 262(i)(3).
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without a prescribing doctor’s intervention.37 Innovative biologics—
the biologic equivalent of “brand-name” drugs—receive twelve years
of data exclusivity38 under the BPCIA (including four years of market
exclusivity), though the Obama Administration has recently called for
reducing this to only seven years.39 Similar to Hatch-Waxman’s 180day generic exclusivity window, the first biosimilar deemed
interchangeable receives a one-year “biosimilar exclusivity” approval
as well.40 The BPCIA vests the FDA with broad discretion in
determining biosimilarity: The FDA may rely on various studies or
waive these requirements,41 make rules,42 issue guidance, or even
categorically ban biosimilar applications for classes of biologics.43
Although the FDA has yet to approve a biosimilar, the United
States stands to benefit significantly from the BPCIA’s biosimilar
approval pathway. In 2010, four of the top-ten selling drugs were
biologics, and estimates indicate this will rise to seven of the top ten
by 2016.44 Many of these biologics stand to soon go off-patent,
opening the door for competition from cheaper biosimilars.45 As a
result, industry estimates suggest that the biosimilar approval

37.

Id.

38.

“Data exclusivity” refers to the period during which a follow-on biologic,
or biosimilar, is not permitted to use a reference drug’s safety
information to file a truncated or expedited application for FDA
approval. During the data exclusivity period, a proposed biosimilar must
pay the costs—in time and capital—to secure FDA approval as though
it were an original biologic. “Market exclusivity” is a minimum period
during which the FDA is not permitted to approve any biosimilar (or
generic) versions of a drug, granting that original biologic an effective
monopoly regardless of developed biosimilars. See generally Vincent J.
Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make Biologic Patents Passé?, 29
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 249, 260-64 (2013).

39.

See OFFICE

OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, BUDGET
U.S. GOV’T, FISCAL YEAR 2014 40, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/asse
ts/budget.pdf. See discussion infra Part III.C.

OF

THE

40.

Kanter & Feldman, supra note 8, at 76.

41.

See id. at 77.

42.

See id.

43.

42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(8)(E).

44.

Miller, supra note 6, at 3.

45.

FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON
BIOLOGIC
DRUG
COMPETITION
4
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/emerginghealth-care-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-tradecommission-report/p083901biologicsreport.pdf.
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pathway established by the BPCIA could save U.S. consumers $250
billion over the next decade.46
Yet recent lobbying efforts, regulatory delays, and proposed state
legislation threaten to obstruct the BPCIA-expedited pathway to
inexpensive, powerful biosimilar drugs and to preserve a handful of
biologic monopolies. This resistance has come in two forms. First, the
FDA has resisted the spirit of the BPCIA through a number of
biosimilar-hostile regulatory moves, often at the behest of several
major drug manufacturers, despite the BPCIA’s clear legislative
intent and structure imposing a Hatch-Waxman-style compromise
between innovative biologics (roughly equivalent to brand-name
traditional drugs) and biosimilars (roughly equivalent to generics).
Equally problematic legislative proposals wend their way through a
substantial fraction of state legislatures. Several states have already
passed laws obstructing life-saving biosimilar drugs, and these state
proposals share multiple BPCIA-thwarting traits in common. I next
examine both of these obstacles to cheaper and more broadly
available biosimilar drugs.

II. Current Barriers to Biosimilar Entry
Despite a prominent place in federal law, billions of dollars in
potential savings, and an increasing trend toward international
approval, pharmaceutical monopolists work to frustrate effective
biosimilars adoption in the United States. As with efforts to obstruct
generic drugs to maintain or enhance profits on brand-name
pharmaceuticals, some biologics manufacturers have lobbied federal
regulators, state legislatures, and even international organizations to
prevent consumers from obtaining effective biosimilars.47 These legal
maneuvers take many forms, from delaying approval of safe
biosimilars to abrogating previous commitments to international drugnaming protocols to circumventing Congressional intent for biosimilar
substitution. I next outline these international, federal, and state
efforts before turning to the legal and economic cases against these
barriers to entry.
A.

FDA Resistance to a Biosimilars Pathway

The FDA has proven surprisingly resistant to promoting
biosimilars approval, despite the BPCIA’s mandate to the FDA to
implement a framework balancing the interests of both biologics and
biosimilars manufacturers. The BPCIA unequivocally expresses the
ACA’s intention and sense “that a biosimilars pathway balancing

46.

Miller, supra note 6, at 7.

47.

See Pollack, supra note 3.
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innovation and consumer interests should be established,”48
commending this responsibility broadly to the FDA.49 The
commissioner has admirably echoed these sentiments, stating that
implementing an effective biosimilars pathway is “among [the FDA’s]
highest priorities.”50 Yet the FDA’s 2012 draft guidelines, explaining
their tentative approach towards a biosimilars pathway, leave several
key areas unresolved, thus increasing uncertainty for biosimilars
manufacturers and, ultimately, costs for consumers. The draft
guidelines fail to provide any meaningful guidance as to what
standards the agency will employ in determining whether a biosimilar
is interchangeable with a biologic.51 Similarly, the draft guidelines do
not establish—or even broadly cabin—the nature or extent of drug
testing the FDA will require in comparing a proposed biosimilar and
its reference biologic.52 The FDA does not expect to even finalize this
draft until later this year at the earliest,53 while prominent industry
lawsuits regarding the FDA’s biosimilars management could delay the
FDA’s implementation of an approval pathway until as late as 2022.54
But the FDA’s resistance to biosimilars exceeds merely passive
resistance to biosimilar drugs or hesitation to proceed with a
biosimilar applications pathway; indeed, the FDA is currently
considering whether to adopt a different naming policy for biosimilars
than the policy that has been in place for generic drugs for over fifty
This new policy has the potential to both increase
years.55

48.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
7001(b), 124 Stat. 804 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).

49.

42 U.S.C. § 262 (k)(5)(B).

50.

PHARM.
ASS’N,
Biosimilars,
GENERIC
http://gpha.hfwebdev.com/issues/biosimilars (last visited Sept. 20,
2014) (quoting the U.S. Food & Drug Comm’r Martha Hamburg in
February 2012).

51.

42 U.S.C. § 262 (k)(4) (2009) (enacted).

52.

Id. § 262 (k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(aa)-(cc).

53.

Mia Burns, Frost & Sullivan Breaks Down Biosimilars Market,
DRUGS.COM (Oct. 2013), http://www.drugs.com/news/frost-sullivanbreaks-down-biosimilars-market-48276.html (“The FDA has yet to
finalize its guidelines . . . . Toscano said during [a] webinar that the
final agency guidance is anticipated during 2014, with the first
biosimilars being held in anticipation for some time in 2015.”).

54.

Stanton J. Lovenworth, The New Biosimilar Era: The Basics, the
Landscape, and the Future, 6 LIFE SCI. L. & INDUS. REP. 972, 972
(2012).

55.

AM. MED. ASS’N, Generic Naming: Who is USAN?, http://www.amaassn.org//ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-science/united-statesadopted-names-council/generic-drug-naming-explained.page (last visited
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information costs for prescribers and pharmacists and to discredit the
substitutability of biosimilar drugs.
Both traditional drugs and biologics typically have two names: a
brand name—often called a proprietary name—and a nonproprietary
name. The nonproprietary name reflects certain characteristics of the
drugs such as chemical structure or pharmacological properties.56 The
FDA, working with the U.S. Adopted Names Council and the U.S.
Pharmacopeial Convention, has the role of determining drugs’
nonproprietary names—the United States Adopted Name (USAN).57
Outside of the United States, the World Health Organization (WHO)
assigns
drugs’
nonproprietary
names—the
International
Nonproprietary Names (INN). Although the USAN and INN are
independent of each other, the two groups work to ensure the USAN
and INN are typically identical.58 As a result, products with the same
active ingredients can be recognized globally by their nonproprietary
name.
But proponents of a new naming policy have worked to disrupt
this naming convention. These groups assert that unique names are
necessary to track any adverse events from biologics and biosimilars.59
These groups point to a study of traditional drugs that found that
generics and branded products under the same INN sometimes suffer
misattributions of adverse events.60 Consequently, the WHO and FDA
are reconsidering the naming of biosimilars. Potential new policies
range from minor deviations, such as adding a prefix or a biosimilars
identifier to existing names, to completely different INNs/USANs for
biosimilars.61
Sept. 9, 2014) (noting that the current naming policy was developed in
the 1960s).
56.

FTC Follow-on Biologics Workshop, supra note 1, at 68844.

57.

Id.

58.

WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO Informal Consultation on International
Nonproprietary Names (INN) Policy for Biosimilar Products 5
(Programme on Int’l Nonproprietary Names, Working Document
07.211),
available
at
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/inn/BiosimilarsINN_Report.pdf
?ua=1.

59.

See Mari Serebrov, WHO: Biosimilars Not the Same, Why Should
Names
Be?,
BIOWORLD
TODAY
(Mar.
28,
2014),
http://www.bioworld.com/content/who-biosimilars-not-same-whyshould-names-be-0.

60.

See ERIKA LEITZAN ET AL., THE FOOD & DRUG L. INST., BIOSIMILAR
NAMING: HOW DO ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING DATA SUPPORT THE
NEED FOR DISTINCT NONPROPRIETARY NAMES FOR BIOSIMILARS 3
(2013), http://www.fdli.org/docs/members-only/lietzan-faers-bio-final-327-13.pdf?sfvrsn=0.

61.

See Serebrov, supra note 59.

150

Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015
Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and Barriers to Entry

Critics of this potential policy change point to several other pieces
of evidence showing that unique nonproprietary names are not
necessary to accurately track adverse events. Rather than relying on
data from traditional non-biological drugs, they point to evidence
from adverse event reporting for actual biologic drugs, demonstrating
that biologic products are almost universally identified by their
unique proprietary name, not the INN that they share with other
drugs.62 Additionally, they explain that existing technology for
adverse event reporting renders unique nonproprietary names
unnecessary for safety reporting. In fact, current pharmacy technology
enables manufacturers and regulators to track pharmaceuticals down
to a specific batch.63 Thus, changing this time-tested naming
convention will add negligible or no safety benefits.
Moreover, by virtue of biologics’ inherent complexity, no two
batches of biologics are identical; even consecutive batches of a
biological drug from the same manufacturer are not identical.64 These
natural variations undercut any theoretical justification for a different
biosimilar nonproprietary name, as these biosimilars merely
demonstrate slight variations not unlike differences between original
biologics batches. Furthermore, every approved biosimilar necessarily
has been shown to have no meaningful differences from its reference
drug, obviating the need for a distinct nonproprietary name entirely.
Instead of providing safety benefits, changes to the nomenclature
for biosimilars would necessarily impede consumer access to these
drugs in several ways. The most direct is in basic information costs to
healthcare professionals and pharmacists: the current policy of
assigning nonproprietary names focuses on active ingredients,
developing a terminology consistent for therapeutic rather than
62.

See McCamish, supra note 13, at 13 (reporting adverse event data for
the Sandoz biologic products: Binocrit, Abseamed, Epoetin Alfa Hexal,
Omnitrope, Zarzio); Sumant Ramachandra, Senior V.P., Chief Scientific
Officer, Hospira Inc., Presentation for FTC Biosimilars Workshop on
Naming Proposals and Impact on Competition, 7 (Feb. 4, 2014),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/FollowOn%
20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legislativ
e%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Competition
/ramachandra.pdf (reporting adverse event data for the Hospira biologic
products, Retacrit and Nivestim).

63.

Bruce Leicher, Anti-Competitive Deterrents to Investment and
Innovation in Biosimilars and Interchangeable Biologics, MOMENTA, 24
(Feb.
4,
2014),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/FollowOn%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legis
lative%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Compet
ition/leicher.pdf; Miller, supra note 6, at 8-9.

64.

McCamish, supra note 13, at 6-8.
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business, purposes. Departing from this naming uniformity would
partially obscure which biologics were approved for similar uses.65 It
would also perniciously suggest—contrary to the BPCIA’s very
definition of biosimilarity—that biosimilar drugs differed in clinically
meaningful ways from their corresponding original biologics.66 But
perhaps more unhelpfully, a naming change would undoubtedly
encourage a messaging campaign to discourage biosimilars parallel to
the long-since-discredited attempts by brand-name pharmaceuticals to
discourage consumers from generic traditional drugs. Neither of these
results is consistent with the BPCIA’s delegation to the FDA to
establish a cost-effective, sensible pathway to biosimilars approval.
B.

Anti-Biosimilars Lobbying in the States

Encouraged by some success in resisting the BPCIA at the federal
level, opponents of biosimilars have proposed bills in numerous state
legislatures designed to impede the prescription of approved
biosimilars in place of innovative biologics.67 While most states that
have considered these laws have rejected them, a handful of states
such as North Dakota, Florida, Utah, Virginia, and Oregon have
passed laws restricting biosimilars,68 and similar legislation continues
to be considered in numerous other states.69 These laws seek to impose
dubious patient consent, recordkeeping, and physician notification
requirements to discourage healthcare professionals and consumers
from dispensing or consuming biosimilars.
Biosimilar-restrictive legislation typically relies on three
interlocking mechanisms: (1) a notification and recordkeeping
requirement for the prescribing physician of any biosimilar; (2) a
patient’s veto or patient notification requirement, or both; and (3) a
set of burdensome recordkeeping (or labeling) provisions for
pharmacists.70 These three interlocking mechanisms collectively
65.

E.g., Lovenworth, supra note 54, at 9.

66.

FTC Follow-On Biologics Workshop, supra note 1, at 68844.

67.

See Pollack, supra note 3.

68.

Michelle Derbyshire, U.S. State Legislation on Biosimilars Substitution,
2 GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J. 155 (2013), available at
http://gabi-journal.net/us-state-legislation-on-biosimilarssubstitution.html.

69.

Jessica S. Mazer, Assistant Vice President, State Affairs, PCMA,
Introduction to State Biosimilar Substitution Laws, 3 (Feb. 4, 2014),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/FollowOn%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legis
lative%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Compet
ition/mazer.pdf.

70.

See, e.g., S. 2190, 63rd Leg. § 1(1)(a)-(e) (N.D. 2013); H.B. 365, 102d
Leg., §2(2)((a)-(d)) (Fla. 2013).
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attempt to circumvent Congress’s determination through the BPCIA
that interchangeable biologics can be substituted without a doctor’s
intervention. These state laws not only allow physician interference
with an FDA-approved substitute, but actively promote interference
through unnecessary notification and recordkeeping requirements.
The physician notification provisions contained in the state
legislation require pharmacists to notify prescribers upon dispensing
an interchangeable biosimilar.71 These provisions increase burdensome
and often duplicative notifications by and to healthcare professionals,
and the provisions also deter physicians from substituting biosimilars
for original biologics. The notification requirement delivers a message
to physicians that biosimilars are different, or even suspect, thus
raising fears among physicians that they could be exposed to
malpractice claims based on substitution.72 The physician notification
provisions, however, directly contradict the BPCIA’s conspicuous
absence of a physician notification for substitution of biosimilars,
much less interchangeable biosimilars. The absence of such a
requirement in the BPCIA is understandable: the BPCIA’s definition
of biosimilarity—that is, requiring the absence of meaningful clinical
differences in safety and potency—precludes the vast majority of
medical distinctions between original biologics and biosimilar drugs.
Moreover, these requirements, when applied to interchangeable
biosimilars as anti-biosimilar laws contemplate, are even more
pointless because no meaningful distinctions exist between original
biologics and interchangeable biosimilars.
Patient veto and patient notification provisions act similarly by
requiring a pharmacist to notify a patient of a biosimilar
substitution,73 and in some cases, by allowing the patient the right to
refuse the biosimilar product selected by the pharmacist.74 These
provisions raise fears in patients that they are receiving a different or
inferior product that warrants advance notification.75 Also, if given
the ability to veto a biosimilar substitution, patients may opt for the
brand-name biologic that has advertised heavily, even when this
option would increase patient and payer costs without any resulting
medical benefits.
Finally, anti-biosimilar laws generally impose lengthy
recordkeeping provisions on pharmacists. These require pharmacists
71.

S.B. 2190, 63rd Leg. (N.D. 2013); Fla. H.B. 365; S.B. 460, 77th Leg. (Or.
2013); S.B. 78, 60th Leg. (Utah 2013); S.B. 1285, 63rd Leg. (Va. 2013),
H.B. 1422, 63rd Leg. (Va. 2013).

72.

Leicher, supra note 59, at 7.

73.

N.D. S.B. 2190; Fla. H.B. 365; Or. S.B. 460; Utah S.B. 78; Va. S.B.
1285, Va. H.B. 1422.

74.

N.D. S.B. 2190.

75.

Mazer, supra note 69, at 4.
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to keep records, typically for three to five years, of all biosimilar
substitutions made for all patients.76 Pharmacists must of course
maintain these superfluous, and often duplicative, records consistent
with extensive and costly federal regulations protecting sensitive
medical data.77 By imposing these burdensome requirements every
time a pharmacist substitutes a biosimilar, recordkeeping provisions
deter biosimilar substitution. The recordkeeping requirements also
suggest to pharmacists that biosimilars’ efficacy and safety is
uncertain, warranting extensive recordkeeping requirements.
Proponents argue that these regulations are necessary to prevent
the immunogenic reactions, adverse side effects, and diminished
effectiveness that could result from nonequivalent biosimilar
substitution.78 However, these concerns are unwarranted when
examined in light of experiences regarding biosimilars; the European
Union, for example, has maintained a biosimilars approval pathway
for almost a decade, with a similar safety record as original biologics,
billions of Euros in patient savings, and broadly increased patient
access to biologics.79
State anti-biosimilars laws have broadly failed thus far. While five
states have passed anti-biosimilars laws,80 several of the most
populous states have rejected anti-biosimilars laws, including
California, Illinois, and Texas.81 Of the sixteen states that have
contemplated anti-biosimilars measures, more than two-thirds—eleven
in total—have rejected these laws.82 Nevertheless, several states
76.

Florida’s enacted legislation only requires keeping records for two years.
Derbyshire, supra note 68, at 156.

77.

Id. at 155.

78.

BIO Principles on Patient Safety in the Substitution of Biologic
Products,
BIOTECH.
INDUS.
ORG.
(Jan.
24,
2013),
http://www.bio.org/advocacy/letters/bio-principles-patient-safetysubstitution-biologic-products.

79.

Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Stimulating Innovation in the Biologics Industry:
A Balanced Approach to Marketing Exclusivity, TEVA USA GOV’T AFF.
3
nn.7
&
8
(2008),
http://people.bu.edu/kotlikoff/New%20Kotlikoff%20Web%20Page/Kotli
koff_Innovation_in_Biologics21.pdf.

80.

Derbyshire, supra note 68, at 155.

81.

Kurt R. Karst, Biosimilars State Legislation Score Card, FDA LAW
BLOG
(Sep.
4,
2013),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/09/bio
similars-state-legislation-scorecard.html.

82.

Id.; Cameron Lockwood, State Biosimilars Legislation in the U.S.: What
the Situation in California Reveals About the Nuances of the
“Substitution” Debate, IHS HEALTHCARE & PHARMA BLOG (Sept. 3,
2013),
http://healthcare.blogs.ihs.com/2013/09/03/state-biosimilarslegislation-in-the-us-what-the-situation-in-california-reveals-about-thenuances-of-the-substitution-debate/.
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continue to consider anti-biosimilars legislation.83 As I explain below,
anti-biosimilar legislation potentially carries grave consequences for
both patient health and consumer welfare.

III. Consequences from Barriers to Biosimilars
The BPCIA attempts to balance the interests of original biologics
manufacturers in protecting research investments and earning profits
with the interests of both biosimilars manufacturers and consumers in
wider drug access at lower costs. Some federal and state regulatory
proposals act directly contrary to this mandate, seeking to maintain
or even extend original biologics manufacturers’ effective monopolies
over their biologics. Others merely attempt to defeat the BPCIA’s
compromise by discouraging physicians, pharmacists, or consumers
from prescribing, providing, or using safe biosimilars. Both attempts
frustrate the BPCIA’s critical function under the ACA’s twin goals:
medical cost containment and expanded affordable medical coverage. I
next discuss these anti-biosimilars policies’ troubling implications. As
I explain, these impediments reduce competition in the market for
biologic drugs, impede drug innovation, increase drug costs, and limit
patient access to these important medications.
A.

Threats to Competition and Innovation

Proposals to block biosimilars from expedited FDA approval
effectively bar entry to biologics markets, thus extending an already
lengthy monopoly period for original biologics manufacturers. This
extension needlessly locks potential rival firms out of biologics
markets by raising costs to bring biosimilars to market. These
increased costs deter potential entrants, reducing competition; this
reduction in competition decreases innovation, encourages monopoly
pricing, and ultimately increases prices to consumers. Consumers pay
twice for these barriers to entry through more expensive drugs and
reduced access to effective, potentially life-saving, medications.
Barriers to entry include any legal, economic, or practical
limitations that prevent firms from offering products in a given
market; these barriers necessarily increase the likelihood a firm will
obtain a monopoly and charge monopoly prices.84 In the purest sense,
83.

Mazer, supra note 69, at 3-4.

84.

See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 114-117 (1956). See
also GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968).
Stigler defines a barrier to entry as any cost to producing a product
borne only by firms seeking to enter an industry rather than firms
already in it. For example, regulatory costs required to clear an alreadyestablished biologic are already sunk by original biologics manufacturers,
which can be recouped during an original biologic’s exclusivity period.
However, without a workable FDA biosimilars pathway, a new
biosimilar manufacturer must pay these costs anew—likely without
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these are costs that would be borne by firms not currently serving a
market, but that are not currently felt by firms in the market; in
other words, costs that only affect outsiders looking in on a market.85
Some barriers to entry are economic; for example, economies of scale
are cost advantages that firms gain only by obtaining a certain size or
market share. Firms outside a market necessarily lack these
advantages by virtue of having no market share, so these cost
advantages act as a barrier to entry.86 Some barriers to entry are
purely legal, such as data and market exclusivity periods (included in
part in both Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA) which formally prevent
outside firms from offering competing products.87
The BPCIA and Hatch-Waxman represent a compromise on
barriers to entry between original drug manufacturers and subsequent
potential entrants, balancing entry concerns by permitting some
barriers while reducing others. Original drug manufacturers claim—
with some support—that the high research and development costs
necessary to produce successful pharmaceuticals effectively require
extensive monopoly profits merely to recoup their investments.88
Subsequent drug manufacturers, seeking profits and original
manufacturers’ market share, can safely and more affordably
reproduce these expensive drugs, thus reducing the opportunity of
original manufacturers to recoup costs (or amass profits) while
passing savings on to consumers. Each side claims its position will
increase innovation; original manufacturers contend that an extensive
monopoly period is the only way to allow for research into new and
often unproductive drugs, while subsequent manufacturers point out
that competitive markets tend to spur innovation as subsequent firms
jostle for market share and original manufactures continue to

therapeutic benefit—to compete with an original biologic. FDA licensing
provisions are therefore one class of barrier to entry, which state
regulators seek to enhance.
85.

STIGLER, supra note 84, at 67-70.

86.

See Joe S. Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition
of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 15,
15-39 (1954).

87.

See generally US Biosimilars Law May Prove a Barrier to Entry for
Biosimilars, GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (Sept. 23, 2011),
http://gabionline.net/Biosimilars/Research/US-biosimilars-law-mayprove-a-barrier-to-entry-for-biosimilars.

88.

Id. See also Henry Grabowski & Joseph DiMasi, Biosimilars, Data
Exclusivity, and the Incentives for Innovation: A Critique of Kotlikoff’s
White Paper 9 (Duke Univ. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper No. 2009-02,
Feb.
2009),
available
at
http://public.econ.duke.edu/Papers//PDF/FinalDraft2_5_09.pdf.
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innovate to stay ahead of the pack.89 The BPCIA and Hatch-Waxman
offer a compromise between these two competing positions by
granting an extensive exclusivity period to original manufacturers in
order to allow for both substantial cost recoupment and profits, while
at the same time reducing the onerous barriers to entry that the
FDA’s new drug approval pathway imposes.90
Indeed, evidence indicates that Hatch-Waxman spurred
innovation and greatly increased competition in the market for
traditional drugs. Since Hatch-Waxman was enacted in 1984, more
than eight thousand generic drugs have been approved by the FDA.91
Where generics represented only 19 percent of all drugs dispensed
prior to 1984, they now represent over 84 percent.92 Moreover, while
spurring innovation in generic drugs by facilitating their earlier
market entry, Hatch-Waxman continued to protect the patent rights
of branded drug manufacturers, thus encouraging innovation among
these manufacturers as well. Research and development budgets have
continued to rise among brand-name drug manufacturers.93 Similar to
Hatch-Waxman’s effect on innovation, the BPCIA would also be
expected to spur innovation and competition in the market for
biologic drugs. The European Union, which has had an established
regulatory pathway for biosimilars for a decade, has seen a significant
degree of competition in the market for biologic drugs.94
But the regulatory proposals discussed above each threaten to
upset the BPCIA’s legislative balance because each introduces an
additional, unproductive barrier to entry. Disrupting a half-centurylong convention in nonproprietary naming will raise information costs
on consumers, physicians, and pharmacists, deterring biosimilars
89.

Grabowski & DiMasi, supra note 88, at 9. See also Kotlikoff, supra note
79.

90.

Grabowski & DiMasi, supra note 88, at 9.

91.

Fact Sheet: New “Biosimilars” User Fees Will Enhance Americans’
Access to Alternatives to Biologic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(July
16,
2012),
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDr
ugandCosmeticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FDA
SIA/ucm311121.htm.

92.

Letter from John E. Dicken to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 21, at 2;
IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, supra note 21, at 15.

93.

See generally PHRMA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2011 PROFILE (2011)
available
at
http://report.nih.gov/investigators_and_trainees/acd_bwf/pdf/Phrma
_Industry_Profile_2011.pdf.

94.

What You Need to Know About Biosimilar Medicinal Products, EUR.
COMM’N
15-16,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/files/docs/biosimilars
_report_en.pdf.
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prescription and use even when medically appropriate. Varying
nonproprietary names will imply none-too-subtly that biosimilar
medications are clinically different, despite the BPCIA’s stern
mandate that all biosimilars must contain no clinically meaningful
difference from corresponding original biologics. Notification and
recordkeeping provisions similarly send a message that the safety or
efficacy of biosimilars is not clear, leading to uncertainty and
unwarranted fears. These state-level requirements also raise
transaction costs on medical professionals, making healthcare more
expensive to no one’s benefit, save for a handful of pharmaceutical
monopolists. Both policies will raise barriers to entry, harming
consumers.
Indeed, empirical evidence confirms that anti-biosimilars policies
will stifle competition, raising prices and limiting consumer access to
life-saving medications. Data from Australia, Japan, and Europe
indicates that varying nonproprietary names reduces biosimilars’
market presence, thus restricting competition in the market for
biologics.95 Varying U.S. nonproprietary names would likely have the
same anticompetitive effect. Similarly, empirical evidence
demonstrates
how
state-level
laws
burdening
biosimilars
substitutability would harm consumers: States that required
notification, recordkeeping, and consent to substitution for generic
drugs saw significantly less generic drug usage.96 These provisions—by
design—stifled competition and innovation in traditional drug
markets.97 Policymakers should not repeat this unfortunate mistake. It
is clear that these proposed policies will merely reduce competition
and innovation in biologics markets. As I discuss next, this economic
harm will translate directly into patient harm, violating the BPCIA’s
goals of increasing healthcare availability while controlling healthcare
costs.
B.

Higher Consumer Prices and Reduced Patient Access

These barriers to entry through the international, national, and
state attempts to prevent consumers from receiving life-saving
biosimilars drugs will harm consumers. Restricting competition in the
market for biologic drugs will necessarily keep the prices for biological
drugs out of reach for many consumers. A principle as old as markets
95.

See McCamish, supra note 13, at 15-16 (reporting on IMS health data
from 2012); Ramachandra, supra note 62, at 8.

96.

William H. Shrank et al., State Generic Substitution Laws Can Lower
Drug Outlays Under Medicaid, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1383, 1383 (2010);
Norman V. Carroll et al., The Effects of Differences in State Drug
Product Selection Laws on Pharmacists’ Substitution Behavior, 25 MED.
CARE 1069, 1074 (1987).

97.

See Shrank et al., supra note 96.
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themselves demonstrates why: The less competition in a market, the
higher prices will be.98
Biologic drugs are currently prohibitively expensive for many
consumers. The average cost of a biologic drug is twenty-two times
greater than a traditional drug.99 The average annual cost of a
biologic drug is estimated to be $34,550,100 but annual costs for many
drugs exceed $200,000.101 Moreover, by requiring large patient
coinsurance for specialty drugs, such as biologics, most prescription
drug insurance plans fail to fully defray these massive costs.102 As a
result, many consumers cannot afford to obtain these life-saving
drugs.
In contrast, increasing competition in the market for biologic
drugs will necessarily cause prices to decrease, allowing more patients
access to these treatments. There is substantial room for competition
to reduce prices as manufacturers of branded biologics currently reap
substantial monopoly profits. The average gross margin for these
drugs is close to 98 percent; that is, manufacturers retain
approximately 98 percent of their revenues after they pay the cost of
manufacturing the biologics.103 Current barriers to entry already result
in this 98 percent margin for pharmaceutical monopolists; preserving
barriers through either regulatory inaction or state legislation will
merely extend original manufacturers’ monopoly power, thus
maintaining high prices while reducing biologics’ availability to
patients.

98.

ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 383 (1995).

99.

Anthony D. So & Samuel L. Katz, Op-Ed., Biologics Boondoggle, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, at A23.

100. E.A. Blackstone & J.P. Fuhr, Jr., Innovation and Competition: Will
Biosimilars Succeed?, 9(1) BIOTECH. HEALTHCARE 24, 26 (2012).
101. Francis Megerlin et al., Biosimilars and the European Experience:
Implications for the United States, 32(10) HEALTH AFF. 1803, 1803
(2013).
102. See Leigh Purvis, Consumer Perspective on Biosimilars, AARP, 8-12,
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/FollowOn%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legis
lative%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Compet
ition/purvis.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
103. Aaron Gal, Senior Analyst, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., LLC., FTC
Presentation, Biosimilars: Commercial Prospective, 5 (Feb. 4, 2014),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/FollowOn%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legis
lative%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Compet
ition/gal.pdf.
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Both domestic and international evidence demonstrates how
increased competition from biosimilars will reduce prices in the
market for biologic drugs. Since Hatch-Waxman was enacted in 1984,
competition between generics and brand-name pharmaceuticals in
traditional drug markets has saved consumers over $1 trillion.104
Consumers saved $157 billion through generics competition in 2010
alone.105 As the FTC has concluded, “Overall, generic drug
competition has substantially reduced many prescription drug prices
and total prescription drug expenditures, and increased access to
therapeutic drugs for more Americans.”106 Similarly, evidence from
Europe reveals that biosimilars have stimulated market competition,
reducing prices and increasing access to life-saving drugs. Data
indicates that biosimilars in the European Union will save consumers
between $15 billion and $45 billion from 2007 to 2020.107 These lower
prices significantly improve patient access to these important drugs;
biosimilar entry has increased the volume of biologic drugs dispensed
by approximately 50 percent.108 Potential American savings dwarf
those in Europe; indeed, industry estimates suggest that U.S.
consumers could save over $250 billion in the next decade from
biosimilar competition for just eleven biologic drugs.109 These cost
savings will allow countless more patients the ability to access these
life-saving drugs.
Considered fully, impeding biosimilars unjustifiably increases
healthcare costs while decreasing availability of powerful drugs.
Policies attempting to bar biosimilars from consumers—whether in
the guise of a new naming convention, state regulations encouraging
physician confusion or patient hesitation, or simply increasing
recordkeeping costs—harm patients in favor of helping monopolists.
These barriers to entry should be rejected because they hurt
consumers and upset the BPCIA’s thoughtful compromise.

Conclusion
Biologics are at the forefront of American medicine, promising
treatments and even cures for previously intractable diseases. These
drugs represent a vital and growing share of the American
pharmaceutical sector. But the cost of these drugs puts them beyond
104. Letter from John E. Dicken to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 21, at 4.
105. 2011 A Year of Progress, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N (Sept. 2011)
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/AnnualReport_11.pdf.
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the reach of most patients. Biosimilars appear to be a partial remedy
to this complicated problem, offering lower-cost, powerful therapeutic
benefits to patients who might respond to tested and known biologics.
The BPCIA, sensibly examining analogous Hatch-Waxman’s
successes in the market for traditional drugs, imports a familiar and
successful compromise between biologics manufacturers’ desire for a
limited monopoly to incentivize innovation and consumers’ need for
broad access to biotherapies. The BPCIA gives original biologics’
manufacturers a lengthy exclusivity period, while still encouraging
potential biosimilar manufacturers to create innovative and similar
drugs through a faster approval process and the promise of
substitutability for interchangeable biosimilars. This compromise
mirrors the successful integration of name-brand and generic
traditional pharmaceuticals, drastically reducing costs and increasing
drug availability. If properly implemented, the BPCIA promises to
similarly expand access to biologic medications.
But federal and state regulators have recently attempted, with
some limited success, to impede the BPCIA’s biosimilars
implementation pathway; these obstacles merely hurt consumers,
specifically patients, for the benefit of a few patent-holders. Policies
such as a different nonproprietary naming system for biosimilars or
state regulations that burden the substitution of interchangeable
biologics required under the BPCIA offer no gains in patient safety or
efficacy and muddle a uniform national program. These obstacles
instead impose costly barriers to entry to potential biosimilar
manufacturers, thereby lengthening original biologics manufacturers’
effective monopoly periods, inhibiting innovation in potential
biosimilars, increasing drug costs, and reducing access to the most
effective available medications. Consumers will benefit tremendously
through increased innovation, lower prices, and broader access to
these drugs if only federal regulators and state legislators will allow it.
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